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Abstract
Many insurance contracts are contingent on events such as hurri-
canes, terrorist attacks or political upheavals, whose probabilities are
ambiguous. This paper offers a theory to underpin the large body of
empirical evidence showing that higher premiums are charged under
ambiguity. We model a (re)insurer who maximises profit subject to
a survival constraint that is sensitive to the range of estimates of the
probability of ruin, as well as the insurer’s attitude towards this ambi-
guity. We characterise when one book of insurance is more ambiguous
than another and general circumstances in which a more ambiguous
book requires at least as large a capital holding. We subsequently de-
rive several explicit formulae for the price of insurance contracts under
ambiguity, each of which identifies the extra ambiguity load.
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1 Introduction
Many (re)insurance contracts are contingent on events such as hurricanes,
terrorist attacks or political upheavals whose probabilities are not known
with precision. Such contracts are said to be subject to “ambiguity”. There
may be several reasons why contracts are subject to ambiguity, including a
lack of historical, observational data, and the existence of competing theo-
ries, proffered by competing experts and formalised in competing forecasting
models, of the causal processes governing events that determine their value.
For example, ambiguity is a salient feature in the insurance of catastrophe
risks such as hurricane-wind damage to property in the southeastern United
States. Here, historical data on the most intense hurricanes are limited,
and there are competing models of hurricane formation (Bender et al., 2010;
Knutson et al., 2008; Ranger and Niehoerster, 2012). This ambiguity is
increased by the potential role of climate change in altering the frequency,
intensity, geographical incidence and other features of hurricanes.
There is by now a body of evidence to show that, faced with offering a con-
tract under ambiguity, insurers increase their premiums, limit coverage, or
are unwilling to provide insurance at all. Much of the academic evidence
is survey-based: actuaries and underwriters from insurance and reinsurance
companies are asked to quote prices for hypothetical contracts in which the
probabilities of loss are alternatively known or unknown (Cabantous, 2007;
Cabantous et al., 2011; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989, 1992; Kunreuther
et al., 1993, 1995; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). Their responses
reveal that prices for contracts under ambiguity exceed prices for contracts
without ambiguity and with equivalent expected losses, which is consis-
tent with ambiguity aversion1 and thus in line with a much larger body
of evidence on decision-making, starting with Ellsberg’s classic thought ex-
periments on choices over ambiguous and unambiguous lotteries (Ellsberg,
1961). In the industry, one can find guidance that insurers should increase
their ‘prudential margins’ (i.e. capital holdings) under ambiguity (e.g. Bar-
low et al., 1993) and below we explain how this leads to higher premiums.
Yet, despite the evidence, there is seemingly little theoretical work that can
explain or formally motivate these ambiguity loadings. In this paper we seek
to fill this hole by offering a formal analysis of the connection between, on
the one hand, ambiguous information about the performance of a book of
insurance and, on the other hand, the premium charged for a new contract.
We do so via the capital held against the book: our starting point is a well-
known model of the price of insurance, according to which the objective is
to maximise expected profits subject to a survival constraint (thus in the
tradition of Stone, 1973), which is imposed by managerial or regulatory fiat
1We give formal definitions of ambiguity, ambiguity aversion and related concepts later.
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out of concern for ensuring solvency or avoiding a downgrading of credit.
An example of such a constraint, imposed by regulation, is the European
Union’s new Solvency II Directive (where it is called a Solvency Capital
Requirement). Our twist is that the capital held is sensitive to the range
of estimates of the probability of ruin and to the insurer’s attitude towards
ambiguity in this sense.
Based on recent contributions to the theory of decision-making under ambi-
guity, we characterise circumstances in which one book of insurance is “more
ambiguous” than another, and establish general conditions under which
more ambiguous books entail higher capital holdings under our capital-
setting rule. We then use the rule to derive pricing formulae for ambiguous
contracts in a way that isolates the additional ambiguity load, distinct from
the more familiar risk load. We examine the properties of the ambiguity load
under different assumptions about the insurer’s information: it is shown to
depend on the ambiguity of the contract being priced, as well as the insurer’s
ambiguity aversion. It also depends on the relationship between the ambi-
guity of the new contract and the ambiguity of the pre-existing book, while
under some circumstances it can interact with the coventional risk load. We
hope that these pricing formulae, or further extensions and refinements of
them, may prove practically useful in the industry: one of the consequences
of the lack of existing theory is that the practice of loading contract prices
under ambiguity does not appear to have been codified and may often use
back-of-the-envelope calculations and heuristics (Hogarth and Kunreuther,
1992).
Our paper is a complement to recent work on how ambiguity, and ambiguity
aversion, on the part of would-be policyholders affects the characteristics
of optimal insurance contracts (Alary et al., 2013; Gollier, 2014). In this
work, the insurer is taken to be ambiguity-neutral, whereas our insurer is
ambiguity-averse. Our paper is also related to recent work on ambiguity
aversion and robust control that has taken a similar approach, but applied
it to different problems. Notable examples include Garlappi et al. (2007) on
portfolio selection, and Zhu (2011) on catastrophe-risk securities. Finally,
our paper offers an alternative approach to previous work in the literature on
insurance that has also considered ambiguity under the auspices of ‘model
uncertainty’ (e.g. Cairns, 2000). This work also features ambiguity-neutral
insurers, because it is assumed that they reduce compound lotteries à la
probabilistic sophistication (Machina and Schmeidler, 1992; Epstein, 1999).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the decision
problem formally. Section 3 considers the relationship between how am-
biguous a book of insurance is and how much capital the insurer must hold,
drawing on elements of Jewitt and Mukerji’s (2012) characterisation of the
“more ambiguous” relation. Section 4 then derives explicit pricing formulae
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for insurance contracts under ambiguity. Finally, Section 5 concludes with
a discussion of the descriptive and normative appeal of our capital-setting
rule, and some interpretation of our results.
2 The insurer’s decision problem
We take the point of view of an insurer who faces uncertainty over the per-
formance of its book and wishes to maximise expected profits subject to a
survival constraint. The classic treatment of this problem characterises the
insurer’s uncertainty using a single probability measure over the space of
events determining the book’s return (e.g. Kreps, 1990). Under this account
the insurer may control the likelihood of insolvency/ruin by choosing a cap-
ital holding, since the likelihood of ruin is then simply the probability that
the book’s losses are not covered by the capital.
As we explained in the Introduction, there are, however, important cases
where the insurer’s information does not take the form of a single probability
measure over a space of relevant scenarios. In such cases, it may entertain
a multiplicity of possible measures over the space of payoff-relevant events
and not be certain which of them “correctly” quantifies the uncertainty it
faces. Such an insurer is said to face ambiguity.
We model this kind of insurer’s information as follows. There is a metric
space, S, known as the state space, that consists of all of the possible states
of the world that are relevant to the performance of an insurance book,
with the Borel σ-algebra on S denoted B. A book is then a B-measurable
mapping from S to R. We denote the full set of books by F and, where
f ∈ F , interpret f(s) = x as the statement that if s turns out to be the true
state of the world, book f will return the monetary quantity x. A book is
thus identical to a “Savage act” (in the sense of Savage, 1954) and, in terms
of the insurer’s capital setting and pricing, both the pre-existing insurance
portfolio and the new contract to be potentially added to this portfolio may
be regarded as books.
In the classic account of this problem, the insurer is assumed to possess a
single probability measure on B, representing its information about payoff-
relevant events. We, however, wish to allow for cases where the insurer faces
ambiguity and therefore endow it with a set of measures on B, Π, encom-
passing all probability measures it believes might characterise its uncertainty
correctly. We refer to Π as the set of models, and require Π to be compact
and convex. Where the insurer’s book depends, for example, on weather
events, Π may consist of a set of seasonal forecasts, one of which is assumed
to be correct insofar as it accurately measures the likelihood of any member
of B. Where BΠ is a Borel σ-algebra on Π, let ν be the probability measure
on BΠ to represent the insurer’s beliefs about which of the models in Π is
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correct. We require supp(ν) = Π.
Using BR for the Borel σ-algebra on R, for any f ∈ F we can define the
probability measure Pf on BR as follows:
Pf (E) =
ˆ
Π
pi
(
f−1(E)
)
dν
for any E ∈ BR. In words, given the insurer’s beliefs about Π, Pf (E) gives
the probability the insurer places on its book paying out some amount in
E. Throughout this paper, we adopt the convention of using Pf (y) for
Pf ({x : x < y}): the probability, given beliefs ν over the measures Π, that
f pays out less than y.
Let us take as our starting point a familiar model of insurance pricing based
on maximising expected profit subject to a survival constraint, in the tra-
dition of Stone (1973).2 In this model, there is an insurer who, given any
book f ∈ F , sets its capital holding, Zf , as follows:
Zf = min{x : Pf (−x) ≤ θ} (1)
That is, Zf is the smallest holding such that the probability of losses exceed-
ing it is no more than some benchmark level θ (we take it for granted here
and throughout the paper that (1) well defines Zf ). Given how we define
Pf (.), one can alternatively think of x as the Value at Risk of book f with
respect to the “confidence level” 1 − θ. The requirement that the insurer
holds Zf may be interpreted as a managerial or regulatory constraint with
the magnitude of θ representing the conservatism of the regime responsible
for it. The insurer thus focuses on the single probability – as measured by
Pf – of its book paying out less than its capital holding.
We extend this framework to allow the capital holding to depend on both
the range of models Π and the insurer’s attitude to ambiguity about the risk
of ruin. Specifically, our insurer sets Zf according to
Zf = min
{
x : αˆ ·
[
max
pi∈Π
P pif (−x)
]
+ (1− αˆ) ·
[
min
pi∈Π
P pif (−x)
]
≤ θ
}
(2)
where αˆ ∈ [0, 1], and the measure P pif on BR is defined as P pif (E) = pi
(
f−1(E)
)
.
In contrast to (1), (2) requires the insurer to consider the dispersion in Π. 3
2Ignoring, however, his stability constraint on the volatility of the ratio of losses to
expenses.
3Notice that (2) does not require a probability measure ν on BΠ, rather it suffices to
know the models that yield respectively the maximum and minimum probability of the
book paying out less than the insurer’s capital holding. However, to say in Section 3
that one book is more or less ambiguous than another, we do require such a probability
measure. We also require it to explicitly identify the ambiguity load in the premium price,
which is the purpose of Section 4.
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The weight factor αˆ plays a role akin to the ambiguity attitude parameter
α in the well known α-maxmin expected utility (α-MEU) representation
of choice under ambiguity of Ghirardato et al. (2004). In particular, we
show in the next section that a more ambiguous book, which can be defined
in terms of the preferences under ambiguity of an α-MEU decision-maker
inter alia, incurs a higher capital holding Zf if and only if the weight factor
αˆ ≥ 0.5. Therefore αˆ indexes the insurer’s aversion to ambiguity about
the risk of ruin. Notice that if αˆ = 1 then (2) simplifies to Zf = min{x :
maxpi∈Π P pif (−x) ≤ θ}, which encodes a concern for robustness in a way
analogous to the decision rule in Hansen and Sargent (2008), which itself has
been shown to be equivalent to Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) axiomatically
founded “maxmin” expected utility representation (Hansen and Sargent,
2001).
The capital holding affects the premium charged on a new contract, added to
the existing portfolio, in the following way. An insurer endowed with book f
who agrees to an additional contract c, itself a book, ends up with book f ′ =
f + c. We define the addition operation over F pointwise – that is, for f, c ∈
F , f + c = f ′ where f ′(s) = f(s) + c(s) for all s – and note that F is closed
under addition – i.e. if f, c ∈ F , f + c ∈ F . As a result of signing c, it needs
to increase its capital holding by Zf ′ − Zf , and if c is competitively priced,
then the underwriter’s expected profit from the contract cannot exceed the
opportunity cost of this incremental capital holding. Thus, using y for the
opportunity cost of capital, if c is competitively priced it must be that:
µc = y
(
Zf ′ − Zf
)
(3)
The expected return on c, µc, is equal to the price the insurer charges the
counterparty to c, pc, less the expected loss on c (including administrative
costs), Lc, and we say an insurer is competitive4 whenever it always sets pc
such that µc satisfies (3):
pc = Lc + y
(
Zf ′ − Zf
)
(4)
The purpose of Section 4 is to expand the pricing formula (4) so that the
ambiguity load – the uplift on the premium due to ambiguity about the new
contract and the existing book – can be isolated under various distributional
assumptions.
3 Ambiguity and the capital holding
Jewitt and Mukerji (2012) provide various choice-based accounts of what it is
4Note this our approach does not require the assumption of perfect competition. y
may be interpreted as a managerial target rate of return rather than opportunity cost, in
which case it could be consistent with a monopolistic or oligopolistic insurance industry.
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for one act – book of insurance in our context – to be “more ambiguous” than
another. We focus on one of these accounts, according to which book f is
more ambiguous than g whenever any ambiguity-neutral agent is indifferent
between the two books, any ambiguity-averse agent prefers g to f , and any
ambiguity-seeking agent prefers f to g. Note that under this definition
what it takes for f to be more ambiguous than g depends on what it means
for an agent to be ambiguity-averse, -seeking, or -neutral, in keeping with
revealed-preference traditions.
To characterise ambiguity attitude we primarily use Ghirardato, Maccheroni
and Marinacci’s (2004, GMM) axiomatically based α-MEU representation of
choice under ambiguity, according to which preferences, given by the relation
 over F , are such that, for any bounded f, g ∈ F :
f  g ⇐⇒ α ·min
pi∈Π
´
S u (f(s)) dpi + (1− α) ·maxpi∈Π
´
S u (f(s)) dpi ≥
α ·min
pi∈Π
´
S u (g(s)) dpi + (1− α) ·maxpi∈Π
´
S u (g(s)) dpi
(5)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is an index of ambiguity attitude, u is a continuous, non-
decreasing function representing risk attitude in the usual way, and Π, which
is compact and convex, represents the beliefs revealed by . Where A and
B belong to the class of α-MEU preferences with common beliefs Π, A
is more (less) ambiguity averse than B if and only if αA ≥ (≤)αB, and
uA and uB are equal up to an affine transformation (GMM, Prop. 12).
Furthermore if Π is “centrally symmetric”, in that there exists a probability
measure pi∗ – known as the ‘centre’ of Π – such that pi ∈ Π if and only
if pi∗ − (pi − pi∗) ∈ Π (Jewitt and Mukerji, 2012), then the preference  is
ambiguity neutral if and only if α = 0.5. It follows that, for this centrally
symmetric Π,  is ambiguity averse (seeking) if and only if α > (<)0.5.
In the extreme case where α = 1, the preference is equivalent to maxmin
expected utility in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
α-MEU is not the only way to characterise choice in a manner that distin-
guishes the decision-maker’s beliefs and preferences towards ambiguity. An
alternative is Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji’s (2005, KMM) “smooth”
representation of choice under ambiguity, and indeed Jewitt and Mukerji
(2012) apply their definitions of more ambiguous to both the GMM and
KMM representations. We will focus on the α-MEU representation here,
since it is very similar in structure to our capital-setting rule (2), which in
turn allows for the derivation of particularly tractable expressions for the
price of contracts affected by ambiguity, developed in Section 4.
Note that (5) does not constrain the preferences of agents over unbounded
books. This means that if we were to define “more ambiguous” in terms
of the choices of all ambiguity-averse, -neutral, and -seeking agents with
preferences consistent with GMM’s representation, we would never be able
to describe one unbounded book as being more or less ambiguous than
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another. And as we wish to do just this, we characterise “more ambigu-
ous” relative to a narrower class of preferences than those consistent with
GMM’s representation. We thus define PΠ as the set of all preferences over
F that are consistent with GMM’s representation, that rank any f, g ∈ F
according to (5) provided all the expectations in (5) are defined, and that
share beliefs given by Π. The ambiguity attitude of any ∈ PΠ is de-
termined by α just as in GMM’s representation. We say ∈ PΠ is f -
constrained if and only if, given the function u and weight α associated with
, α ·min
pi∈Π
´
S u (f(s)) dpi + (1− α) ·maxpi∈Π
´
S u (f(s)) dpi is defined.
Let us now define what it means for one book to be “more ambiguous” than
another. We denote the symmetric component of  using ∼ as usual.
Definition 1. For any f, g ∈ F , f is PΠ-more ambiguous than g iff:
[i.] For all f - and g-constrained, ambiguity-neutral ∈ PΠ, f ∼ g;
[ii.] For any f - and g-constrained A,B∈ PΠ, where A is ambiguity
neutral: if B is more ambiguity averse than A, g B f ; and if A is more
ambiguity averse than B, f B g.
Where the particular configuration of beliefs is unimportant or obvious from
the context, we will omit the qualification “PΠ-” and simply say f is “more
ambiguous” than g. We describe book f as unambiguous if, for all g ∈ F ,
either g is more ambiguous than f , or f is not more ambiguous than g. f
can only be unambiguous if P pif = P pi
′
f for all pi, pi′ ∈ Π. An ambiguous book
is then any book that is not unambiguous.
To state our first results we require some further terminology. First, a
Markov kernel from (Π,BΠ) to itself is any map (pi,E) 7→ Kpi(E) such that
Kpi is a probability measure on BΠ. For any pair of books f and g, we say
K pi-garbles f into g whenever, for all E ∈ BR, the following condition holds
for all pi′ ∈ Π:
P pi
′
g (E) =
ˆ
Π
P pif (E)dKpi′ (6)
The existence of a pi-garbling from f to g implies that the likelihood that g
pays out in E conditional on any pi′ is a weighted average of the likelihood
that f pays E across all pi ∈ Π. In this sense, f ’s payoff depends more
sensitively on the realisation of the true probability model than g’s does.
Let Π be compact, convex and centrally symmetric with centre pi∗. Then
Jewitt and Mukerji characterise a Markov kernel K from (Π,BΠ) to itself as
centre-preserving if and only if, for all E ∈ BR,
P pi
∗
f (E) =
ˆ
Π
P pif (E)dKpi∗
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Whenever there is a centre-preserving pi-garbling from f into g, P pi∗f (E) =
P pi
∗
g (E) for all E ∈ BR. Thus a centre-preserving pi-garbling is analogous to
a mean-preserving spread familiar from the analysis of risk: just as a mean-
preserving spread preserves the expected payoff of a prospect, but makes
this payoff more sensitive to the true state of the world, a centre-preserving
pi-garbling preserves a book’s payoff-distribution at the centre, pi = pi∗, but
makes the payoff-distribution more strongly dependent on the true model in
Π.
Given this, the first result we report from Jewitt and Mukerji should not
come as a surprise.
Proposition 1. [Jewitt-Mukerji 1] For any f, g ∈ F , if there is a centre-
preserving pi-garbling from f to g then f is more ambiguous than g.
It thus follows that if there is a centre-preserving pi-garbling from f into
g, then any ambiguity-averse agent whose preferences belong to PΠ would
prefer f to g. The next step is to show that, given the sufficient condition
set out in Proposition 1, a more ambiguous book f incurs a higher (lower)
capital holding than its counterpart g if and only if αˆ ≥ (≤)0.5.
Proposition 2. Suppose Zf and Zg are well defined by (2). Then if there
is a centre-preserving pi-garbling from f to g, Zf ≥ (≤)Zg if and only if
αˆ ≥ (≤)0.5.
Proof : See Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that our capital-setting rule encodes ambiguity attitude
through the parameter αˆ in a parallel manner to the parameter α in the
GMM representation. It implies that, all else being equal, an ambiguity-
averse insurer, represented by αˆ > 0.5, will hold a larger amount of capital
against the risk of ruin of a more ambiguous book, where the definition of
“more ambiguous” comes from Proposition 1. By contrast, an ambiguity-
neutral insurer with αˆ = 0.5 will hold neither more nor less capital, while
an ambiguity-seeking insurer (αˆ < 0.5) will hold less capital.
In turn, we can use this result to consider how ambiguity attitude affects
the premium charged for a specific contract:
Corollary 1. Let f + c = f ′ and f + c′ = f ′′, and suppose there is a centre-
preserving pi-garbling from f ′ to f ′′. Then on the assumption that Lc = Lc′
and y > 0, pc > pc′ for any insurer setting its capital holding according to
(2), with αˆ > 0.5, and its premium price according to (4).
The Corollary considers the case where the addition of a new contract c to
the existing book f results in a more ambiguous book f ′, compared with
the addition of an alternative new contract c′, which results in book f ′′.
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The most straightforward reason for this would be that c is in itself more
ambiguous than c′, although the difference between the ambiguity of the
resulting books f ′ and f ′′ could also stem from ambiguity about how the
payoffs from the new contracts co-vary with the existing book. The assump-
tion that Lc = Lc′ amounts to a condition that the administrative costs of
c and c′ be the same (since both c and c′ have the same expected loss),
while y > 0 will surely hold. The Corollary thus tells us that, when setting
premiums for any pair of new contracts, an ambiguity-averse insurer will
charge a higher premium for the contract that results in a more ambiguous
insurance portfolio, all else being equal.
In Section 4 we explore circumstances in which book f ′ is more ambiguous
than f under various distributional assumptions.
3.1 U-Comonotonicity
Proposition 1 applies to any pair of books under any set of beliefs, but it
provides only a sufficient condition for one book to be more ambiguous than
another. Thus, Proposition 2 does not establish that (2) encodes ambiguity
aversion over all pairs of books. However, we can use a second result from
Jewitt and Mukerji’s analysis that provides sufficient and necessary condi-
tions for book f to be more ambiguous than g, provided f , g and Π satisfy a
certain condition – known as U-comonotonicity – in relation to each other:5
Definition 2. Π is U-comonotone for F∗ ⊂ F iff Π can be placed in a linear
order ≤U such that for all non-decreasing bounded functions u:
pi ≤U pi′ ⇐⇒
ˆ
S
u(f(s))dpi ≤
ˆ
S
u(f(s))dpi′ for all f ∈ F∗
In words, Π is U-comonotone over F∗ if all expected utility maximisers with
bounded utility non-decreasing in money and a book belonging to F∗ would
agree on a single ranking of which of any pair in Π represented “better news”
about the true probability model. This might be the case, for example,
where the set F∗ consisted of books that paid out a fixed sum in case of an
extreme weather event: Π could then be ordered such that pi ≤U pi′ if and
only if pi′ places a lower probability on the extreme weather event than pi
does. Indeed, this example indicates when it might be plausible to assume
U-comonotonicity, namely when each of the set of acts under consideration
is stochastically ‘similar’, in the sense that the realisation of a pi ∈ Π has
similar consequences for the likelihood of the acts in F∗ producing “good”
or “adverse” consequences. Jewitt and Mukerji give the example of a pair
of bets on the S&P equities index as being stochastically similar (events),
5Note this is a special case of a more general definition, which can be found in Jewitt
and Mukerji (2012).
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in comparison with a pair of bets, where one is on the S&P and the other
is on the outcome of a boxing match. The acts in this paper are books of
insurance and may therefore be considered stochastically similar, especially
since the principal interpretation of Π that we offer is of competing estimates
of catastrophic risks, which should affect many books’ pay-offs in a similar
fashion.
To state Jewitt and Mukerji’s characterisation of ambiguity aversion under
U-comonotonicity, we require a definition of the comparative ambiguity of
events E,E′ ∈ BR, in addition to the definition of the comparative ambiguity
of acts given previously in Proposition 1. For any pair of payoffs x and y,
xEy denotes the binary act that pays x if the realised state s ∈ E and y
otherwise.
Definition 3. Given events E,E′ ∈ BR, E is a more ambiguous event than
E′ if, for all ambiguity neutral A∈ P,
xE′y ∼A xEy and x(¬E′)y ∼A x(¬E)y;
for all B∈ P, such that B is more ambiguity averse than A,
xE′y B xEy and x(¬E′)y B x(¬E)y;
for all B∈ P, such that A is more ambiguity averse than B,
xE′y B xEy and x(¬E′)y B x(¬E)y,
where x > y.
In the specific context of α-MEU preferences, E is a more ambiguous event
than E′ if and only if E′ is a centre-preserving pi-garbling of E for Π compact,
convex and centrally symmetric, i.e. where acts f and g in (6) are unit bets
on E and E′ respectively.
The following Proposition characterises ambiguity aversion under U-
comonotonicity, by establishing that events constituting adverse payoffs un-
der book f are more ambiguous events than the corresponding adverse pay-
offs under book g.6
Proposition 3. [Jewitt-Mukerji 2] Suppose Π is compact, convex and cen-
trally symmetric with centre pi∗ and is U-comonotone on {f, g}. Then the
following three statements are equivalent:
6The result reported here is slightly different to that in Jewitt and Mukerji, who de-
fine U-comonotonicity in terms of all non-decreasing (bounded and unbounded) utility
functions but consider only bounded books. Our statement of the result encompasses all
books but defines U-comonotonicity in terms of bounded utility functions; the proof is
nonetheless as in Jewitt and Mukerji with obvious modifications.
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[1.] f is PΠ-more ambiguous than g;
[2.] For each x, Exf ≡ {s ∈ S : f(s) ≤ x} , Exg ≡ {s ∈ S : g(s) ≤ x} ∈ BR,
Exf is a more ambiguous event than Exg ;
[3.] There is a centre-preserving pi-garbling from f to g, for pi, pi′ ∈ Π,
pi ≤U pi′, the map (α, h) 7→ Pαpi+(1−α)pi
′
h is supermodular on [0, 1] × {f, g}.
Specifically for 0 ≤ α < α′ ≤ 1,
Pαpi+(1−α)pi
′
g − Pα
′pi+(1−α′)pi′
g ≤ Pαpi+(1−α)pi
′
f − Pα
′pi+(1−α′)pi′
f
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that if f is more ambiguous than g,
its payoff distribution is more sensitive to the realisation of the true model
in Π. This result allows us to obtain the equivalent of Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. If Π is U-comonotone on {f, g} and f is more ambiguous
than g then Zf ≥ (≤)Zg if and only if αˆ ≥ (≤)0.5.
Proof : see Appendix.
Proposition 4 has the same implications for the capital holdings of insurers
as Proposition 2, the difference being in the way in which any book of
insurance is defined as being more ambiguous than another. An ambiguity-
averse insurer with αˆ > 0.5 will hold a larger amount of capital against the
risk of ruin of the more ambiguous book in the pair, all else being equal.
In addition, Proposition 4 has the same implications for the premium price
attached to a new contract that results in a more ambiguous insurance
portfolio. It will be higher than the premium charged for a new contract
that results in a less ambiguous insurance portfolio, defined according to
Proposition 3, if and only if the insurer is ambiguity-averse with αˆ > 0.5.
4 Contract pricing under ambiguity
We now examine the impact of ambiguity on the price of an individual con-
tract given a capital holding set according to (2) and competitive pricing of
premiums according to (4). We derive several pricing formulae, which show
explicitly how introducing ambiguity leads to a departure from a benchmark
pricing formula in the absence of ambiguity, i.e. we explicitly identify an ad-
ditional ‘ambiguity load’. Our starting point is a model, influential in the
actuarial literature and in the insurance industry, which utilises information
about the mean and variance of losses on the new contract, as well as on
the existing book (Kreps, 1990).
We examine four types of ambiguity, chosen on the basis of their analytical
tractability and applicability to real insurance problems. The four cases
differ on the distribution of model parameters assumed under the measure ν.
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We only consider contract pricing, thus we ignore deductibles, co-insurance
and other design options that an insurer might use to manage ambiguity.
These would be interesting avenues for future research (see Amarante et al.,
2015).
4.1 Benchmark: no ambiguity
As a benchmark for what follows we review the case where the insurer’s
information is unambiguous. The set of books under consideration is F0 ⊂
F , where F0 is defined relative to a given Π as follows: f ∈ F0 iff the density
of f(s) under P pif on {S,B} for all pi ∈ Π is parameterised by mean µf and
variance σ2f . We define the addition operation over F0 pointwise – that is,
for f, f ′ ∈ F0, f + f ′ = f ′′ where f ′′(s) = f(s) + f ′(s) for all s – and note
that F0 is closed under addition – i.e. if f, f ′ ∈ F0, f + f ′ ∈ F0.
It is worth emphasising that even in this framework we assume that the
insurer sets its capital holding according to rule (2) and we allow Π to
be non-singleton – implying that, across the class of all books, the insurer
may face some ambiguity. However, because we restrict our focus in the
benchmark case to F0, the insurer faces no ambiguity and therefore its
capital holding rule is equivalent to that in (1). We adopt this approach in
order to make clearer the generalisations that follow to richer sets of books.
Where Φ is a standardised cdf, given whatever assumption about functional
form the insurer finds appropriate (e.g. normal, gamma, etc.), and −z =
Φ−1(θ), the insurer’s capital holding for f ∈ F0 is determined by:
Zf = zσf − µf (7)
Given competitive pricing (3) this implies:
µc =
yz
(1 + y)(σf
′ − σf )
Recalling that where ρc,f is the correlation coefficient for the random vari-
ables c(s) and f(s), σ2f ′ = σ2f + σ2c + 2σcσfρc,f , we have:
σf ′ − σf = σc 2σfρc,f + σc
σf ′ + σf
And hence, where Rc,f := (yz/(1 + y)) (2σfρc,f + σc)/(σf ′ + σf ):
µc = Rc,fσc
Using the general expression for the price of a premium set by a competitive
insurer, we can now state Kreps’s (1990) more specific pricing result, the
proof of which is immediate from the analysis above:
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Proposition 5. [Pricing without ambiguity] If f, c ∈ F0, then a competitive
insurer with book f will set pc as follows:
pc = Lc +Rc,fσc (8)
The second element on the right-hand side is the risk load for contract c.
Note that it arises solely as a consequence of the insurer’s need to limit
the probability of ruin to a certain level (encoded in rule (2)): without this
constraint the competitive price of the contract would simply be Lc. As
one would expect, the risk load is increasing in the riskiness of the contract
(measured by σc), the contract’s correlation with the insurer’s pre-existing
book (ρc,f ), the opportunity cost of capital (y), and it is decreasing in the
acceptable probability of loss (increasing in z – a decreasing function of θ).
4.2 Mean uncertain; variance known
4.2.1 Mean uniformly distributed
Our first case of ambiguity involves considering a space of books F1 that,
given some Π and ν, satisfies7: (1.i) for all f ∈ F1 and all pi ∈ Π, f(s)
under P pif on {S,B} has mean µpif and variance σ2f ; (1.ii) for all f ∈ F1, µpif
is uniformly distributed on [af , bf ] given ν on {Π,BΠ}; (1.iii) F1 is closed
under addition; and (1.iv) F0 ⊆ F1. Note that it is impossible to satisfy the
additivity condition without violating (1.ii) unless, for all f, f ′ ∈ F1:
µpif ′ = af ′ + (µpif − af )
(bf ′ − af ′)
(bf − af ) (9)
which implies that Π is U-comonotone for F1. In the cases examined here,
a more ambiguous book therefore incurs a higher capital holding as per
Propositions 3 and 4 in Section 3.
To illustrate where a structure like this might apply, consider the following
example.
Example 1. Suppose our insurer has a collection of forecasts at its disposal,
all of which agree on the payoff-variance of any given book, but amongst
which there is disagreement over certain books’ payoff-expectations. Specif-
ically, there is a most pessimistic simulation, which reports the lowest mean
payoff for all the books – for book f this is af – and a most optimistic sim-
ulation, which gives the highest reported mean for any book – bf for book
f . For any book, it is sure that the variance is as reported – σ2f for book f –
and thinks the true mean must lie somewhere between these optimistic and
7Note that F1 may not be unique given Π and ν. This is also the case for F2,F3, and
F4 introduced below.
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pessimistic bounds. It constructs Π and ν using two assumptions. First,
the members of Π are ordered according to their pessimism so that (9) is
satisfied and for any c ∈ [af , bf ], µpif = c for one pi ∈ Π. Second, ν is set such
that condition (1.ii), imposing a uniform distribution on µpif , holds. The first
assumption may be justified in case the insurer finds it reasonable, while the
second is reasonable provided it has no evidence to suggest any value of µpif in
[af , bf ] is more plausible than any other, in which case the uniformity of µpif
follows from the principle of insufficient reason. Under these assumptions,
any book it considers belongs to F1 given Π and ν.
Given the decision rule (2), Zf is set to reduce the probability of ruin to
an acceptable level under the weighted sum of the most pessimistic and
optimistic models, i.e. for any f ∈ F1
Zf = zσf − [αˆ · af + (1− αˆ) · bf ]
= zσf − αˆaf + (αˆ− 1)bf
Where the models are uniformly distributed this implies
Zf = zσf + (2αˆ− 1) ·
(√
3sd[µpif ]
)
− µf (10)
where sd[µpif ] is the standard deviation of the random variable µpif , equal to√
1/12(bf − af )2 under the uniformity assumption.
We now proceed in parallel to the exposition of the previous sub-section,
supposing that a competitive insurer with book f ∈ F1 accepts the further
contract c ∈ F1 and thereby ends up with the book f ′ = f + c. Using (10)
and (3) as above, we obtain:
µc = Rc,fσc +
√
3y(2αˆ− 1)
1 + y
(
sd[µpif ′ ]− sd[µpif ]
)
Using the fact that
Var[µpif ′ ] = Var[µf pi] + Var[µpic ] + 2Cov[µpif , µpic ]
and furthermore that, given (9), sd[µpif ]sd[µpic ] = Cov [µpif , µpic ], we can define
Ac,f,1 ≡
[√
3y(2αˆ− 1)
1 + y
](
2sd[µpif ] + sd[µpic ]
sd[µpif ′ ] + sd[µpif ]
)
so that our first pricing result under ambiguity follows straightforwardly:
Proposition 6. [Pricing with uniform mean] If f, c ∈ F1, then a competitive
insurer with book f will set
pc = Lc +Rc,fσc +Ac,f,1sd[µpic ]
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It is easy to see how Proposition 6 generalises Proposition 5. If c is un-
ambiguous then it must belong to F0, in which case sd[µpic ] = 0 and so pc
is set according to (8). However, if c is in F1 \ F0 – that is to say c has
ambiguous returns – then pc also incorporates an ambiguity load equal to
Ac,f,1sd[µpic ]. The ambiguity load is positive, provided the index of ambigu-
ity aversion αˆ > 0.5. It is increasing in αˆ and in sd[µpic ], the (approximate)
measure of ambiguity in c8. It is also increasing in the cost of capital, and it
is increasing in the ambiguity of the pre-existing book (measured by sd[µpif ])
whenever αˆ > 0.5.
4.2.2 Mean triangularly distributed
We now consider an alternative space of books, F2, defined such that given Π
and ν: (2.i) for all f ∈ F2 and all pi ∈ Π, f(s) under P pif on {S,B} has mean
µpif and variance σ2f ; (2.ii) for all f ∈ F2, µpif has a symmetric triangular
distribution on [af , bf ] given ν on {Π,BΠ}; (2.iii) F2 is approximately closed
under addition9; and (2.iv) F0 ⊆ F2. Conditions (2.i), (2.iii), and (2.iv)
mirror their counterparts in the analysis of a uniform mean. Once again,
(2.ii) and (2.iii) may only be satisfied when (9) holds for all f, f ′ ∈ F2 and
Π is U-comonotone for F2.
To illustrate the applicability of F2, we extend Example 1.
Example 2. Suppose the insurer from Example 1 thinks that, for any book
f , values of µpif closer to the midpoint of the range [af , bf ] are more probable
than those further away from it, i.e. roughly speaking that models with more
extreme forecasts of the mean loss are less likely to be correct. Provided
these beliefs are reasonably approximated by the assumption that µpif is
triangularly distributed10 with minimum af , maximum bf and mode (af +
bf )/2, it might proceed by again assuming the members of Π are ordered
according to their pessimism and by setting ν so that (2.ii) is satisfied. Given
Π and ν thus constructed, every book it considers will belong to F2.
For any f ∈ F2 we have:
Zf = zσf + (2αˆ− 1) ·
(√
6sd[µpif ]
)
− µf
8See discussions on this point in Jewitt and Mukerji (2012) and Maccheroni et al.
(2010).
9Triangular distributions are not closed under addition, so what this requires is that
an insurer finds it appropriate to approximate the sum of two triangular distributions
f, f ′ ∈ F2 with another triangular distribution that is a member of F2.
10We choose this distribution as (2) does not well-define the capital holding unless
µpif has a bounded support, however triangular distributions are also frequently used to
characterise subjective probability distributions in probability-elicitation exercises.
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which, for f ′ = f + c and f, c ∈ F2, yields:
µc = Rc,fσc +
√
6y(2αˆ− 1)
1 + y
(
sd[µpif ′ ]− sd[µpif ]
)
Where we use Ac,f,2 to denote (
√
6y(2αˆ−1)
1+y )
(
2sd[µpif ]+sd[µ
pi
c ]
sd[µpi
f ′ ]+sd[µ
pi
f
]
)
, this gives us:
µc = Rc,fσc +Ac,f,2sd[µpic ]
from which the next pricing result is immediate:
Proposition 7. [Pricing with triangular mean] If f, c ∈ F2, then a compet-
itive insurer with book f will set
pc = Lc +Rc,fσc +Ac,f,2sd[µpic ]
The result generalises Proposition 5 by incorporating an ambiguity load
that is zero for c ∈ F0 and increasing in sd[µpic ]. Like Proposition 6 it is also
increasing in the index of ambiguity aversion αˆ and in the cost of capital,
while the relationship between the ambiguity load and the ambiguity of the
existing book is the same as before. However, the switch from a uniform
distribution to a triangular distribution implies that, for any given standard
deviation, the range of possible values increases, thus an ambiguity-averse
reinsurer would require a greater ambiguity load.
4.3 Mean known; variance uncertain
We now focus on a space of books, F3, defined for a given Π and ν such
that: (3.i) for all f ∈ F3 and all pi ∈ Π, f(s) under P pif on {S,B} has mean
µf and variance (σpif )2 ; (3.ii) for all f ∈ F3, σpif has a uniform distribution
on [af , bf ] given ν on {Π,BΠ}; (3.iii) F3 is closed under addition; and (3.iv)
F0 ⊆ F3. As in previous sections, additivity and the uniformity of σpif imply
that for any f, f ′ ∈ F3 and pi ∈ Π, σpif and σpif ′ are linearly related as follows:
σpif ′ = af ′ + (σpif − af )
(bf ′ − af ′)
(af − bf ) (11)
Unless F3 = F0, Π is not U-comonotone for F3.
We imagine this case applying to an insurer in an analogous position to that
described by Example 1, except with a range of estimates of the standard
deviation of losses and certainty over the mean.11
11Though note the appeal to the principle of insufficient reason to justify the uniformity
of σpif for all f is weaker here. The insurer could equally invoke the principle to impose the
uniformity of
(
σpif
)2, in which case the collection of books it considers could not satisfy
(3.ii).
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Working as before, Zf is set to reduce the probability of ruin to an acceptable
level under the weighted sum of the most pessimistic and optimistic models,
i.e. for any f ∈ F3
Zf = αˆ · z · bf + (1− αˆ) · z · af − µf
= z [αˆbf + (1− αˆ)af ]− µf
= z
[
E[σpif ] + (2αˆ− 1) ·
(√
3sd[σpif ]
)]
− µf (12)
and thus, where f, c ∈ F3 and f ′ = f + c, (3) implies:
µc =
yz
1 + y
(
E[σpif ′ − σpif ]
)
+
√
3yz(2αˆ− 1)
1 + y
(
sd[σpif ′ ]− sd[σpif ])
)
Using the fact that E[σpif ′−σpif ] = E[σpic
2σpif ρcf+σ
pi
c
σpi
f ′+σ
pi
f
], we can further decompose
the risk load yz1+y
(
E[σpif ′ − σpif ]
)
into two terms, first recovering the equiv-
alent of the risk load in the absence of ambiguity, and second obtaining a
term capturing how the risk load depends on ambiguity over σpic :
µc = E[Rc,fσpic ] +
√
3yz(2αˆ− 1)
1 + y
(
sd[σpif ′ ]− sd[σpif ])
)
= E[σpic ]E[Rc,f ] + Cov[σpic ,Rc,f ] +
√
3yz(2αˆ− 1)
1 + y
(
sd[σpif ′ ]− sd[σpif ])
)
To obtain the ambiguity load, take a similar approach as before, using the
fact that Var[σpif ′ ] = Var[σpif ]+Var[σpic ]+2sd[σpif ]sd[σpic ]corr
[
σpif , σ
pi
c
]
and, given
(11), that sd[σpif ]sd[σpic ] = Cov [σpif , σpic ]. Thus, defining
Ac,f,3 =
√
3yz(2αˆ− 1)
1 + y
(
2sd[σpif ] + sd[σpic ]
sd[σpif ] + sd[σpif ′ ]
)
we have
µc = E[σpic ]E[Rc,f ] + Cov[σpic ,Rc,f ] +Ac,f,3sd[σpic ]
which gives us our next pricing result:
Proposition 8. [Pricing with uniform standard deviation] If f, c ∈ F3, then
a competitive insurer with book f will set
pc = Lc + E[σpic ]E[Rc,f ] + Cov[σpic ,Rc,f ] +Ac,f,3sd[σpic ]
Once again, whenever c ∈ F0, the pricing formula above reduces to (8). In
contrast to our previous results, however, introducing ambiguity affects the
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price of a contract via two additional terms rather than one. First, as in our
earlier results, there is a term, Ac,f,3sd[σpic ], that is increasing in the ambi-
guity of c, sd[σpic ], in the index of ambiguity aversion αˆ, in the cost of capital
and the smaller is the acceptable probability of loss (the larger is z). The
dependence of the ambiguity load on z is new and follows immediately from
(12) – it is due to the fact that ambiguity in this example concerns the vari-
ance of returns, rather than mean returns. The second term, Cov[σpic ,Rc,f ],
reflects the fact that uncertainty over σpic leads to uncertainty over the risk
load. Since Cov[σpic ,Rc,f ] could in principle depend negatively on the ambi-
guity of c, the overall ambiguity load could, in contrast to the other cases
examined so far, be negative.
4.4 Mean and variance uncertain
As a final exercise, we consider an informational structure that nests two
of the cases described above: where both the mean and variance are inde-
pendently uniformly distributed. Thus we consider a space of books, F4,
that satisfies: (4.i) for all f ∈ F4 and all pi ∈ Π, f(s) under P pif on {S,B}
has mean µpif and variance
(
σpif
)2
; (4.ii) for all f ∈ F4, µpif is uniformly dis-
tributed on [af , bf ], σpif is uniformly distributed on [a′f , b′f ], and µpif and σpif
are independent given ν on {Π,BΠ}, ; (4.iii) F4 is closed under addition;
and (4.iv) F0 ⊆ F4. Given this definition, for any pair f, f ′ ∈ F4, µpif and
σpif must satisfy conditions (9) and (11) (the latter with obvious relabelling).
Apart from cases where F4 ∈ {F0,F1}, Π is not U-comonotone for F4.
Proceeding in the usual way, we have, for any f ∈ F4:
Zf = z
[
E[σpif ] + (2αˆ− 1) ·
(√
3sd[σpif ]
)]
+ (2αˆ− 1) ·
(√
3sd[µpif ]
)
− µf
So for f, c ∈ F4, a competitive insurer with book f prices c such that
µc = yz1+y
(
E[σpif ′ − σpif ]
)
+
√
3yz(2αˆ− 1)
1 + y
(
sd[σpif ′ ]− sd[σpif ])
)
+
√
3y(2αˆ−1)
1+y
(
sd[µpif ′ ]− sd[µpif ]
)
It is then clear that we can progress using steps from our analyses of F1 and
F3 above to reach our final pricing formula.
Proposition 9. [Pricing with independent uniform mean and standard de-
viation] Where f, c ∈ F4, a competitive insurer with book f will offer
pc = Lc + E[σpic ]E[Rc,f ] + Cov[σpic ,Rc,f ] +Ac,f,1sd[µpic ] +Ac,f,3sd[σpic ]
Thus, where books and contracts belong to F4, the ambiguity load for any
contract is the sum of a component (Ac,f,1sd[µpic ]) arising due to ambigu-
ity in the contract’s mean, a component (Ac,f,3sd[σpic ]) reflecting ambiguity
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in its standard deviation, and there is also the effect of ambiguity about
the standard deviation of the contract on the risk load. That Ac,f,1sd[µpic ]
and Ac,f,3sd[σpic ] are additive results from our restriction that the mean and
standard deviation are independent; another way of arriving at the same
formula would be to assume that the mean and standard deviation were
linearly related, with higher variances corresponding to lower means.
5 Concluding Remarks
The main contribution of this paper has been to establish a clear connec-
tion between ambiguity and the pricing of (re)insurance. We show, at a
general level, that under our capital-setting rule increasing ambiguity leads
to higher capital holdings and thus to higher costs, provided the (re)insurer
is averse to ambiguity about the risk of ruin. We then show how, under
a range of distributional assumptions, our capital-setting rule gives rise to
particular pricing formulae for insurance contracts, all composed of distinct
risk and ambiguity loads. These pricing formulae are testable predictions of
the theory.
Admittedly we have had to make relatively specific assumptions about the
probability distributions describing ambiguity. Since they must be bounded
in order that our capital-setting rule is well defined, we employ uniform and
triangular distributions. However, these two distributional forms have quite
strong appeal as characterisations of ambiguous beliefs. The uniform dis-
tribution follows from the application of the principle of insufficient reason,
which might often be deemed appropriate, if for some reason (e.g. insufficient
data or dependence of different models) the comparative performance of dif-
ferent forecasting models cannot be evaluated. The triangular distribution
is also frequently used to characterise subjective probability distributions in
probability-elicitation exercises.
But how tenable is our assumption that the capital-setting rule takes the
form specified in (2)? From a descriptive perspective, we have already shown
that its implications for pricing decisions are consistent with the behavioural
evidence in the literature. Of the survey-based studies mentioned in the In-
troduction, Hogarth and Kunreuther (1992) is distinctive in that it provides
tentative evidence from a sample of actuaries of the decision procedures they
actually followed. There was some evidence of the use of heuristics to load
the premium, such as a simple, ad hoc multiplying coefficient on the expected
value of the premium, or on the variance of the loss distribution. This is
on the face of it at odds with the mechanics of the decision process posited
here. At the same time, however, there was also evidence that actuaries had
in mind the effect the new contract would have on the overall risk of the in-
surer’s ruin, as in our framework. Indeed, the risk of ruin is known to be an
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important consideration more generally when insurers set capital holdings
and price contracts, especially for catastrophe risks (e.g. Kunreuther and
Michel-Kerjan, 2009). Considering the rule from a normative perspective,
one could evaluate the axiomatic foundations of the similar α-MEU rule as
set out in Ghirardato et al. (2004). However, decision rules like this are
typically motivated from the perspective of an individual decision-maker or
social planner – whether it is rational for a corporate entity to follow them
remains an open question.
The results in Section 4 suggest insurance contract prices should be increas-
ing in the insurer’s degree of ambiguity aversion, and in their ambiguity
(as measured by the variance of their uncertain distributional parameters),
provided the insurer is ambiguity averse overall. In practice this may not
hold if our assumption that models are ordered by their pessimism over the
uncertain parameters is violated, for in these cases increasing ambiguity in
a contract may allow the insurer to “hedge” against the ambiguity in its
pre-existing book. We do not explore this kind of information structure for
reasons of tractability and note that, in any case, our assumption is reason-
able for some classes of insurance book. For instance, models of the losses
arising from natural disasters or terrorism may be ranked according to their
pessimism over the likelihood of these events.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Let pig = arg maxpi∈Π P pig (−Zg), pig = arg minpi∈Π P pig (−Zg), pif = arg maxpi∈Π P pig (−Zf ),
and pif = arg minpi∈Π P pig (−Zf ), and use pi∗ to denote the centre of Π. Vari-
ous steps in the following use the fact that, given Π is compact and convex,
P pif is mixture linear in pi ∈ Π for any f ∈ F , meaning P λpi+(1−λ)pi
′
f =
λ · P pif + (1− λ) · P pi
′
f for pi, pi′ ∈ Π, λ ∈ [0, 1].
By the central symmetry of Π, there exists a pi ∈ Π such that
P pig (−Zg) = P pi
∗
g (−Zg)− (P pi
g
g (Zg)− P pi
∗
g (−Zg)) (13)
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and there can be no pi′ ∈ Π such that P pi′g (−Zg) < P pig (−Zg), since by
central symmetry this would entail the existence of pi′′ ∈ Π such that
P pi
′′
g (−Zg) = P pi
∗
g (−Zg)−(P pi
′
g (−Zg)−P pi
∗
g (−Zg)) > P pi
∗
g (−Zg)−(P pig (−Zg)−
P pi
∗
g (−Zg)) = P pi
g
g (−Zg). Therefore P pig (−Zg) = P pi
g
g (Zg), and hence, by
(13), 0.5P pigg (−Zg)+0.5P pi
g
g (−Zg) = P pi∗g (−Zg), which under mixture limear-
ity implies P 0.5pi
g+0.5pig
g (−Zg) = P pi∗g (−Zg). Parallel argument gives 0.5P pi
f
f (−Zf )+
0.5P pi
f
f (−Zf ) = P 0.5pi
f+0.5pif
f (−Zf ) = P pi
∗
f (−Zf ).
Since there is a pi-garbling from f to g, there must exist pi ∈ Π such that
P pif (−Zg) ≥ P pi
g
g (−Zg), and where pi′ = pi∗ − (pi − pi∗) ∈ Π, P pi
′
f (−Zg) ≤
P
pig
g (Zg). As the pi-garbling is centre-preserving, it must be that 0.5P pif (−Zg)+
0.5P pi′f (−Zg) = P pi
∗
f (−Zg) = P pi
∗
g (−Zg) = 0.5P pi
g
g (−Zg) + 0.5P pi
g(−Zg). By
mixture linearity we therefore have P αˆpi
g+(1−αˆ)pig
g (−Zg) ≤ P αˆpi+(1−αˆ)pi
′
f (−Zg)
if αˆ ≥ 0.5.
There are now two cases: first, if P αˆpi
g+(1−αˆ)pig
g (−Zg) = θ, mixture lin-
earity and P αˆpi
g+(1−αˆ)pig
g (−Zg) ≤ P αˆpi+(1−αˆ)pi
′
f (−Zg) imply that the capital
holding required under book f must be at least as great as Zg. Second, if
P
αˆpig+(1−αˆ)pig
g (−Zg) < θ, then for any  > 0 there must exist pig1 , pig2 ∈ Π
such that P αˆpi
g
1+(1−αˆ)pig2
g (−Zg + ) > θ – in which case parallel argument to
that of the previous paragraph can show that there are pif1 , pi
f
2 ∈ Π such
that P αˆpi
g
1+(1−αˆ)pig2
g (−Zg + ) ≤ P αˆpi
f
1 +(1−αˆ)pif2
f (−Zg + ) if αˆ ≥ 0.5, and
θ < P
αˆpig1+(1−αˆ)pig2
g (−Zg + ) ≤ P αˆpi
f
1 +(1−αˆ)pif2
f (−Zg + ) for all  > 0 simi-
larly implies Zf ≥ Zg. We therefore have αˆ ≥ 0.5 implies Zf ≥ Zg.
To show the converse implication, we can reason in a parallel manner. As
there is a pi-garbling from f to g, it must be that where pi = arg maxpi∈Π P pig (−Zf )
and pi′ = arg minpi∈Π P pig (−Zf ), P pig (−Zf ) ≤ P piff (Zf ), P pi
′
g (−Zf ) ≥ P pi
f
f (Zf ),
and 0.5P pig (−Zf )+0.5P pi
′
g (−Zf ) = P pi
∗
g (−Zf ) = P pi
∗
f (−Zf ) = 0.5P pi
f
f (−Zf )+
0.5P pi
f
f (−Zf ). Thus we have P αˆpi
f+(1−αˆ)pif
f (−Zf ) ≤ P αˆpi+(1−αˆ)pi
′
g (−Zf ) if
αˆ ≤ 0.5. Reasoning as in the previous paragraph then shows that this im-
plies Zg ≥ Zf in the two possible cases where P αˆpi
f+(1−αˆ)pif
f (−Zf ) = θ and
where P αˆpi
f+(1−αˆ)pif
f (−Zf ) < θ. Thus we have αˆ ≤ 0.5 implies Zf ≤ Zg. 2
Proof of Proposition 4
Let pi = arg maxpi∈Π P pif (−Zf ) and pi = argminpi∈ΠP pif (−Zf ) for book f
and observe that pi (pi) must be the ≥U -minimum (-maximum) of Π. By
U-comonotonicity on {f, g} it follows that pi = arg maxpi∈Π P pig (−Zg) and
pi = argminpi∈ΠP pig (−Zg) too. Following the proof of Proposition 2, it must
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be that P αˆpi+(1−αˆ)pig ({x : x ≤ −Zg}) ≥ θ. Using condition (3) of Proposition
3 we then have
P
αˆpi+(1−αˆ)pi
g ({x : x ≤ −Zg})− P αˆ
′pi+(1−αˆ′)pi
g ({x : x ≤ −Zg}) ≤
P
αˆpi+(1−αˆ)pi
f ({x : x ≤ −Zf})− P αˆ
′pi+(1−αˆ′)pi
f ({x : x ≤ −Zf}) .
If αˆ = 0.5, so that αˆ′ > 0.5, then
P αˆpi+(1−αˆ)pig ({x : x ≤ −Zg}) = P αˆpi+(1−αˆ)pif ({x : x ≤ −Zf}) ,
which implies that
P
αˆ′pi+(1−αˆ′)pi
f ({x : x ≤ −Zf}) ≥ P αˆ
′pi+(1−αˆ′)pi
g ({x : x ≤ −Zg}) ≥ θ
and thus that Zf ≥ Zg. Otherwise if αˆ′ = 0.5, so that αˆ < 0.5, then
P αˆ
′pi+(1−αˆ′)pi
g ({x : x ≤ −Zg}) = P αˆ
′pi+(1−αˆ′)pi
f ({x : x ≤ −Zf}) ,
which implies that
P αˆpi+(1−αˆ)pig ({x : x ≤ −Zg}) ≥ P αˆpi+(1−αˆ)pif ({x : x ≤ −Zf}) ≥ θ
and thus that Zg ≥ Zf . 2
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